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Abstract
We analyse the effects of a government spending expansion in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) model with Mortensen-Pissarides labour market frictions, deep habits and a constant-elasticity-
of-substitution (CES) production function. The combination of deep habits and CES technology is cru-
cial. The presence of deep habits enables the model to deliver output and unemployment multipliers
in the high range of recent empirical estimates, while an elasticity of substitution between capital and
labour in the range of available estimates allows it to produce a scenario compatible with the observed
jobless recovery. An accommodative monetary policy with respect to the output gap alongside sticky
prices plays an important role for the stabilisation properties of the fiscal stimulus.
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1 Introduction
In the recent financial crisis an important dimension along which many governments have taken action
has been fiscal policy. The economics profession and much of the academic discussion placed emphasis
on the issue of whether and to what extent a fiscal stimulus delivers the dual outcome of (i) moderating
the output collapse and (ii) boosting job creation. This assumes great importance also in the light of the
jobless recovery that the US are experiencing in the aftermath of the Great Recession.
As shown in Figure 1, the cyclical component of hours worked per employee closely co-moves with the
cyclical fluctuations of real output, and the cyclical component of unemployment is negatively correlated
with that of output (see Table 1). However, while hours worked per employee and output have been on a
recovery path from 2009 Q2 (the trough of the great recession), the unemployment rate has persistently
remained well above average. In the recovery period, while the correlation between output and hours
worked per employee is 0.99, the correlation between the unemployment rate and output is -0.18. Figure
1 also shows the well known fact in the business cycle literature that the unemployment rate is around
ten times more volatile than output. Hours worked per employee are less volatile than output, but the
volatility has the same order of magnitude.
Correlation coefficients
Hours/employee - Output Unemployment rate - Output
1995 Q1 - 2011 Q1 0.92 -0.63
2009 Q2 - 2011 Q1 0.99 -0.18
Table 1: Correlation coefficients between (i) hours worked per employee and real output; and (ii) the
unemployment rate and real output. (Cyclical components: Percentage deviations from HP-trend for
GDP and hours per employee, percentage deviations from the sample mean for the unemployment rate.
Source: ALFRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and authors’ computations).
In this paper we analyse the effects of a government spending expansion in a dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) model with Mortensen-Pissarides labour market frictions, deep habits in
private and public consumption and a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) production function. The
main results are that: (i) we obtain output and unemployment multipliers inside the range of empirical
estimates without the need to introduce nominal rigidities and the imposition of the zero lower bound
(ZLB) on the nominal interest rate; (ii) we can reproduce a fiscal expansion with low job creation; and
(iii) we can simulate a fiscal stimulus that mitigates the output collapse in a recession but contains the
rise in unemployment only marginally. This scenario is in line with what we observe in the data in the
aftermath of the great recession.
On the size of fiscal multipliers the literature has provided a variety of results. Auerbach et al. (2010)
describe the range of mainstream estimate for multiplier effects as “almost embarassingly large”. Recent
VAR estimates of the output multiplier are generally greater than those predicted by DSGE models with
no zero-lower-bound constraints but still present values varying from 0.7 to 2.5.1
1Pessimistic estimates of the output multiplier (around 0.7) can be found in (Barro and Redlick, 2011; Ramey, 2009);
some contributions find values around one (see Hall, 2009, among others); while other authors (see Blanchard and Perotti,
2002; Monacelli et al., 2010; Blinder and Zandi, 2010; Acconcia et al., 2011; Fragetta and Melina, 2011, among others) report
values above one. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2011) study asymmetries in the propagation of fiscal shocks in booms and
downturns and report an output multiplier of up to 2.5 during recessions.
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Source: ALFRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and authors’ calculations. Percentage deviations from HP-trend for
GDP and hours per employee, percentage deviations from the sample mean for the unemployment rate.
Figure 1: A jobless recovery
The main reason why government spending multipliers are small in models with rational expectation is
to be found in the negative wealth effect triggered by the increase in government purchases. This crowds
out private consumption and investment and makes output respond in a less than proportional way.2
The results in New-Keynesian (NK) models have also been shown to be dependent on the reaction of
monetary policy: the more accommodative the monetary policy, the higher the fiscal multiplier. On the
last point Canova and Pappa (2011) also provide empirical support using VARs. Moreover, substantially
larger-than-one multipliers can be obtained in standard NK models if the ZLB binds.3
To examine the issue of unemployment there is an increasing practice in macroeconomics to introduce
Mortensen-Pissarides search-matching (MPMF) frictions into otherwise standard NK models (Campolmi
et al., 2010; Faia et al., 2010; Monacelli et al., 2010). These models allow to obtain unemployment
equilibria, investigate the traditional unemployment-inflation trade-off, and evaluate the policy effects on
the extensive margin of employment.
A typical problem that arises in RBC and NK models featuring MPMF frictions is their difficulty
in matching the unemployment volatility observed in the data (the so-called “unemployment volatility
puzzle”). In the literature, this has mainly been addressed via the introduction of staggered nominal
wages (Gertler and Trigari, 2006; Sala et al., 2008) although this practice has been criticised by Pissarides
(2009).4 Di Pace and Faccini (2011) tackle the unemployment volatility puzzle via the introduction of
2Woodford (2011) shows that the government spending multiplier is (i) necessarily below one in a neoclassical Real
Business Cycle (RBC) model and exactly the same both in an RBC with monopolistic competition and in a sticky-price
New-Keynesian (NK) model with strict inflation targeting; (ii) exactly one in an NK model with fixed real interest rate; (iii)
somewhere between the two values in a model featuring a Taylor rule.
3Christiano et al. (2009) find that the spending multiplier may also reach 10 at the ZLB if the fiscal stimulus lasts for
exactly the quarters when the ZLB is binding.
4Pissarides (2009) criticises their introduction as a device to solve the unemployment volatility puzzle on the grounds that
while time-series estimates provide evidence for (average) sticky wages, panel-data estimates support the claim that wages
in the new matches are pro-cyclical.
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“deep habits” in consumption as in Ravn et al. (2006).5 The introduction of deep habits in a DSGE
model imply also that a government spending expansion, even in the presence of flexible prices, reduces
the mark-up, fosters the real wage, and crowds in private consumption.6
These are desirable features as there is empirical evidence that (i) private consumption is typically
crowded in by a government spending expansion as opposed to being crowded out as a canonical DSGE
model predicts (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Gali et al., 2007; Pappa, 2009; Monacelli et al., 2010; Fragetta
and Melina, 2011); (ii) the real wage increases after a government spending expansion (Pappa, 2005; Gali
et al., 2007; Caldara and Kamps, 2008; Pappa, 2009; Fragetta and Melina, 2011) as opposed to falling as
in the canonical model; (iii) the mark-up is typically countercyclical and, more specifically, Monacelli and
Perotti (2008) and Canova and Pappa (2011) show that a government spending expansion is accompanied
by a fall in the mark-up in the data. In the empirical literature there is also evidence that the elasticity
of substitution between capital and labour is not one (Klump et al., 2007; Chirinko, 2008; Cantore et al.,
2010a, 2011; León-Ledesma et al., 2010) and that factor shares are time-varying (Blanchard, 1997; Jones,
2003, 2005; McAdam and Willman, 2008; Ríos-Rull and Santaeulália-Llopis, 2010). However, the standard
use of Cobb-Douglas production functions prevents any model from replicating this regularity, as the Cobb-
Douglas implies constant factor shares.7
The model built in this paper is able to match all the mentioned empirical regularities by merging
a standard RBC model with Mortensen-Pissarides labour market frictions, featuring both the intensive
and the extensive margin of employment, deep habits in private and public consumption and a constant-
elasticity-of-substitution (CES) production function. The combination of deep habits and CES technology
is crucial for the jobless outcome of a fiscal stimulus. If the elasticity of substitution between capital and
labour approaches one, i.e. the production function approximates a Cobb-Douglas, the presence of deep
habits in consumption enables the model to deliver output and unemployment multipliers in the range of
recent empirical estimates. As the elasticity of substitution is allowed to drop to values in the range of
available estimates – i.e. the degree of complementarity between capital and labour increases – while the
output multiplier falls only marginally, the unemployment multiplier experiences a sizeable contraction.
The unequal effects on the output and unemployment multipliers depend on the fact that lowering the
elasticity of substitution in the CES production function is equivalent to assuming that the technology
is closer to the Leontief case, i.e. capital and labour are more complements than substitutes. Given
that capital is unable to change instantaneously in response to the fiscal expansion, firms have smaller
incentives to create new jobs through vacancy posting, being this a costly process. However, both the
negative wealth effect (coming from the absorption of resources by the government) and the substitution
of leisure with consumption (coming from the decline in the mark-up due to the presence of deep habits)
still act in the same direction of causing a substantial increase in the supply of hours of work per employee.
In such a case, the expansion in output is driven relatively more by an increase in the hours of work of
5This implies that households form habits on the consumption of varieties as opposed to overall consumption, which leads
to counter-cyclical mark-ups also in a model with flexible prices. Under deep habits, monopolistically-competitive firms
become more competitive because the elasticity of demand becomes procyclical. In addition, expected higher future profits,
in a model with deep habits, induce firms, ceteris paribus, to post more vacancies and this leads to a greater amplification
for the labour market tightness and, hence, equilibrium employment.
6In fact, the reduction in the mark-up determines a strong shift in labour demand which prevails on the shift in supply
(determined by the negative wealth effect) and wages rise. Consumption rises because the negative wealth effect is offset by
a strong substitution effect away from leisure and into consumption induced by the increase in wages.
7See Cantore et al. (2010b) for further details.
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current employees rather than new job creation. Thus, the CES technology with an empirically supported
elasticity of substitution proves to be a useful tool to simulate a fiscal stimulus that mitigates the output
collapse in a recession but contains the rise in unemployment only marginally, being this in line with the
observed jobless recovery.
We do not go as far as claiming that this is the only explanation for the jobless recovery and indeed
this is still a very controversial issue in the literature. Possible explanations of the delay in the response of
unemployment in recovery periods (observed from the 1991 recession onwards) have been associated with
structural change stories such as the availability of a more flexible labour force (temporary workers and
offshoring), the increase in health benefits and a rise in the speed of sectoral reallocations (see Groshen
and Potter (2003), Andolfatto and MacDonald (2004) and Schreft et al. (2005) amongst others). How-
ever, Aaronson et al. (2004a) and Aaronson et al. (2004b) find little support for the structural change
hypothesis. Some other authors have also given a cyclical explanation for the jobless recovery. Examples
are Aaronson et al. (2004a), relating it to a negative labour supply shock; Bernanke (2003), focusing on a
sluggish aggregate demand; and Bachmann (2011), calibrating a DSGE model with adjustment costs to the
extensive margin. In this paper we link the jobless outcome of a fiscal stimulus to factor complementarity.
Finally, for the sake of comparability with the rest of the fiscal stimulus literature, we also explore the
implications of price stickiness and monetary policy. In this case an accommodative monetary policy with
respect to the output gap plays an important role for the size of fiscal multipliers and, more generally, for
the expansionary effects of the fiscal stimulus.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the flexible-price model
with deep habits in consumption and labour market frictions. Section 3 illustrates the calibration. Section
4 presents the results in the flexible-price model and isolates the effects of several features of the model
on the size of the output and unemployment multipliers. Section 5 provides a sticky-price extension.
Finally, Section 6 concludes and sets the agenda for future research. The appendix provides the full model
derivation, the symmetric equilibrium, the steady state and some sensitivity exercises.
2 The Model
The model structure is represented in Figure 2. Households have a fraction of their members employed and
a fraction unemployed. They offer labour services and capital to firms, who hire members of the households
via vacancy posting and operate in an imperfectly competitive market. Households and firms bargain over
a wage. Households and the government exhibit deep habit formation in the consumption of differentiated
goods produced by firms. The government buys a fraction of those goods, pays unemployment benefits to
the unemployed members of households and finances its expenditures by taxing households (and issuing
government bonds in one of the exercises presented below). In the NK extension of the model we add
price stickiness and a central bank who takes the interest rate decision. As most of the building blocks
of the model are standard in the literature, in what follows we present some less known features and we
refer the reader to the appendix for the full model derivation.
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Figure 2: The model
2.1 Deep habits
Following Ravn et al. (2006), we assume that households exhibit external deep habit formation in con-
sumption, i.e. habits are formed on the average consumption level of each variety of good.8 Under deep
habits household j’s utility function is increasing in (Xct )
j, a habit-adjusted composite of differentiated
consumption goods:
(Xct )
j =
[ˆ 1
0
(Cjit − θ
cScit−1)
1− 1
η di
] 1
1− 1η
, (1)
where parameter η is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution across varieties, θc ∈ (0, 1) is the degree
of deep habit formation on each variety, and Scit−1 denotes the stock of external habit in the consumption
of good i. The stock of external habit Scit evolves over time according to the following law of motion:
Scit = #
cScit−1 + (1− #
c)Cit, (2)
where #c ∈ (0, 1) measures the speed of adjustment of the stock of external habit in the consumption of
variety i to changes in the average level of consumption of the same variety Cit.
Each household j solves a two-stage problem. Letting Pit be the price of variety i, they first minimise
total expenditure
´ 1
0 PitC
j
itdi over C
j
it, subject to (1). This leads to the optimal level of demand for each
variety i for a given composite:
Cjit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
(Xct )
j + θcScit−1, (3)
where Pt ≡
[´ 1
0 P
1−η
it di
] 1
1−η
is the nominal price index. Clearly, the level of demand for each variety i
is characterised by a price-elastic component and a price-inelastic component. The second stage of the
problem faced by household j at time t is the standard intertemporal utility maximisation.
Deep habits are present also in government consumption. From a technical point of view this is entirely
8This consumption externality is also known as “catching up with the Joneses good by good”.
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analogous to how deep habits are introduced in private consumption. From an intuitive point of view,
this can be justified by assuming that households also derive habits from the consumption of government-
provided goods. Alternatively, as in Leith et al. (2009), one can also argue that public goods are local in
nature and households care about the provision of individual public goods in their constituency relative
to other constituencies.9
The differences in the transmission mechanism of a fiscal shock in a model with deep habits in con-
sumption work through the fact that the mark-up is counter-cyclical under deep habits even if the model
features fully flexible prices. Under deep habits the mark-up is counter-cyclical due to the co-existence
of two effects: an intra-temporal effect (or price-elasticity effect) and an inter-temporal effect. The intra-
temporal effect can easily be understood by looking at the demand faced by an individual firm i:
ADit = Cit +Git + Iit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
(Xct +X
g
t + It) + θ
c
(
Scit−1 + S
g
it−1
)
,
where Git is the public consumption of variety i, Iit is the component entering the investment aggregator
It (which is not subject to deep habits) and X
g
t and S
g
it are the public counterparts of the habit-adjusted
consumption composite and the stock of habit for variety i. The right-hand side of the demand curve is
given by the sum of a price-elastic term and a price-inelastic term. When the habit-adjusted aggregate
demand (Xct +X
g
t + It) rises, the “weight” of the price-elastic component of demand grows and the effective
price elasticity of demand η˜it ≡ −
∂ADit
∂pit
pit
ADit
= η − θc
(Scit−1+S
g
it−1)
ADit
increases, as opposed to remaining
constant and equal to η as in the standard case (θc = 0). The fact that the elasticity of demand is pro-
cyclical is one determinant for the price mark-up being counter-cyclical. The other determinant comes
from the inter-temporal effect: the awareness of higher future sales coupled with the notion that consumers
form habit at the variety level, makes firms inclined to give up some of the current profits – by temporarily
lowering their mark-up – in order to lock-in new consumers into customer/firm relationships and charge
them higher mark-ups in the future.
2.2 CES production function and “re-parametrization”
We specialise the production function F ((ZK)tKt, (ZN)tntht) as a constant-elasticity-of-substitution
(CES) production function:
F ((ZK)tKt, (ZN)tntht) =
[
αK ((ZK)tKt)
σ−1
σ + αN ((ZN)tntht)
σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
(4)
whereKt is capital, nt is the number of employees, ht are hours worked per employee, (ZK)t and (ZN)t are
capital and labour-augmenting technology shocks, σ is the elasticity of substitution between capital and
labour, and αK and αN are the so-called distribution parameters. Note that, unlike in the Cobb-Douglas
case, the distribution parameters do not represent factor shares of income and are not dimensionless.
In other words, these have dimensions that depend on the measurement units of capital and labour as
discussed in Cantore and Levine (2011). As such, the distribution parameters are meaningless and cannot
be calibrated. In this subsection, we show that once the capital share of income has been calibrated, αK
9Controversies over “post-code lotteries” in health care and other local services (Cummins et al., 2007) and comparisons
of regional per capita government spending levels (MacKay, 2001) suggest that households care about their local government
spending levels relative to those in other constituencies.
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and αN can be “re-parameterized”, i.e. expressed as functions of this share and of endogenous variables
of the model, which in turn depend on the deep parameters. This procedure is conducted in the spirit of
Cantore and Levine (2011).
As σ → 1, the CES production function collapses to a Cobb-Douglas (CD) if and only if αK +αN = 1.
While σ → 0 leads to the Leontief case.
In the CES case, marginal products of capital and labour take the following forms:
FK,t = αK(ZK)
σ−1
σ
t
(
Yt
Kt
) 1
σ
, (5)
FN,t = αN (ZN)
σ−1
σ
t
(
Yt
ntht
) 1
σ
. (6)
Let variables without time subscript denote steady-state values and SK ≡ FKKY ∈ (0, 1) be the cali-
brated capital share of income. Combining equation (5) with the definition of capital share and rearranging
yields αK as a function of the capital share and endogenous variables:
αK = S
K
(
Y
(ZK) · K
)σ−1
σ
. (7)
As σ → 1, i.e. the production function tends to a CD, αK → SK . As the total products of capital and
labour have to add up to total output, the following holds:
FNnh
Y
= 1−
FKK
Y
= 1− SK . (8)
Combining equations (6) and (8) allows us to recover αN :
αN = (1− S
K)
(
Y
(ZN)nh
)σ−1
σ
. (9)
As σ →1, αN → (1 − SK). Note that if the labour market is not Walrasian, i.e. it is characterised
by wage bargaining and hiring costs, (1 − SK) does not represent the labour share, SN , but it also
includes the share of income that is wasted in the search-matching and bargaining process, SSM ≡ g(z)nY ,
where g(z)n represents total hiring costs, which are a function of the vacancy rate z. In equilibrium,
SK + SN + SSM = 1.
3 Parameter choice and calibration
To calibrate the model we assign numerical values to parameters in order to match a number stylised facts
for the US economy in the post-WWII era. The time period in our model corresponds to one quarter in
the data. Table 1 summarises the calibration exercise.
A set of parameters are simply set to values that are widely used in the literature. Namely we set the
subjective discount factor, β, equal to 0.99, which implies a quarterly real interest rate of about 1%. The
capital depreciation rate, δ, and the coefficient of relative risk aversion, σc, are set equal to 0.025 and 2,
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Parameter Value
Discount factor β 0.99
Capital share of income SK 1/3
Capital depreciation rate δ 0.025
Relative risk aversion σc 2
Elasticity of substitution in production function σ 0.4
Elasticity of substitution across varieties η 6
Investment adjustment cost parameter γ 3.24
Degree of deep habit formation θc 0.86
Habit persistence 'c 0.85
Job separation rate λ 0.103
Elasticity of matching to unemployment ω 0.5
Firms’ bargaining power * 0.5
Share of government spending in output g¯/y¯ 0.2
Persistence of government spending shock ρg 0.90
Persistence of tax shocks ρX 0.90
Convexity in hiring cost ψ 1
Elasticity of subst leisure/consumption ' set to target h¯ = 0.40
Scaling factor in hiring cost function χ set to target p¯ = 0.83
Scaling factor in matching function κ set to target q¯ = 0.70
Unemployment benefit wu set to target Θ¯ = 0.70
Table 2: Baseline calibration
respectively, while the capital share of income, SK , takes the conventional value of 1/3. The elasticity of
substitution across varieties, is set to a rather standard value of 6, which implies a steady state markup
of around 20% in the absence of deep habits.
When the production function takes the general CES form, we set the elasticity of substitution, σ,
equal to 0.40, a value close to the empirical estimates in León-Ledesma et al. (2010). We obtain the
Cobb-Douglas as a limiting case, by setting σ → 1. The investment adjustment cost parameter is set
equal to 3.24, the value estimated by Christiano et al. (2005). The degree of deep habit formation, θc, and
the habit persistence, 'c, are set equal to 0.86 and 0.85, respectively. These are the same estimated values
used in Ravn et al. (2006). We then set the convexity parameter in the hiring cost function to 1, which
makes it quadratic as in Gertler and Trigari (2006) and Thomas (2008). The firms’ bargaining power, *,
and the elasticity of matching to unemployment, ω, are both set equal to 0.5. This choice satisfies the
Hosios condition for the efficiency of the equilibrium. There is no reason to believe that this condition
holds in practice, however this parameter choice is shared by most of the existing literature and hence
allows comparability of the results. The value for the job separation rate, λ, is set equal to 0.103 to imply
that jobs last on average 2 years and a half. This is in line with the calculations made by Shimer (2005).
The persistence of fiscal shocks is set equal to 0.90, which is approximately the value observed in the data
(see Monacelli et al., 2010, among others).
Finally, we set (i) the elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption, '; (ii) the scaling
factor in the hiring cost function, χ; (iii) the scaling factor in the matching function, κ, and (iv) the
unemployment benefit, wu, in order to match: (a) a steady-state share of hours worked over total hours,
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h¯, of 40%; (b) a steady-state job finding probability, p¯, equal to 83%, as estimated by Shimer (2005);10
(c) a value for the vacancy filling probability, q¯, equal to 70%, as in Trigari (2009); and (d) a ratio for the
value of non-work to work activities (replacement ratio), Θ¯ ≡ wu−
U¯n/U¯c
Fn
(i.e. the sum of unemployment
benefits and the disutility of work over the marginal product of employment), equal to 70%, a value very
close to the point estimate of 72% by Sala et al. (2008). As the value for the replacement ratio is debated
in the literature and is an important determinant of the unemployment multiplier, we show sensitivity of
our results to different magnitudes for this parameter in the appendix.
In addition to the explicitly-targeted steady-state values, this calibration implies reasonable “great
ratios”; namely a consumption/output ratio of 61%, an investment/output ratio of 18% and a hiring
costs/output ratio of 1%. The choice of the job separation rate, coupled with the job finding probability
implies, through the Beveridge curve, a steady-state unemployment rate of approximately 11%.
4 Results
We present the results starting from a standard neoclassical (RBC) model with search and matching
frictions in the labour market and adding deep habits and the CES technology one at a time. Subsection
4.1 presents the well known results that in the baseline RBC model output and unemployment multipliers
are well below the range of available empirical estimates. It also shows some features at odds with
the data, namely constant price mark-up and factor shares, a negative response of the real wage and a
negative response of consumption following a government spending shock. Subsection 4.2 shows how, even
in the absence of price stickiness and the imposition of a ZLB, the introduction of deep habits magnifies
both output and unemployment multipliers. At the same time, in line with Ravn et al. (2006), now
the mark-up falls, real wages rise and consumption is crowded in after an expenditure expansion. By
introducing the CES production function in Subsection 4.3 we show that, as capital and labour became
more complementary, the growth of output fostered by a government spending expansion is sustained
relatively more by an increase in the intensive margin (current employees work longer hours) than an
increase in the extensive margin (new job creation). Factor shares now present cyclical fluctuations.
Subsection 4.4 shows how the magnitude of the responses of output and unemployment is altered by
distortionary taxation and government debt. Finally, in Subsection 4.5, we explore the effects of a fiscal
stimulus at a recession time, which fosters a jobless recovery.
4.1 Neoclassical benchmark with search-match frictions
In Figure 3 we plot the impulse responses of a number of fundamental macroeconomic variables to a
government spending expansion of size 1% of output. Normalising the size of the fiscal shock as such
allows us to interpret the output responses as fiscal multipliers. For unemployment, we report the absolute
changes in percentage points that the increase in spending by 1% of output triggers.
10Shimer (2005) estimated a monthly job finding probability of 0.45, which corresponds to a quarterly value of approxi-
mately 0.83.
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Figure 3: A government spending expansion (1% of output, lump-sum taxes, balanced budget) in an RBC
model augmented with Mortensen-Pissarides Matching Frictions: the effects of deep habits in consumption.
Note: Line marked by squares: RBC model with Mortensen-Pissarides Matching Friction (MPMF), Cobb-Douglas (CD)
production function (σ → 1) and no habits in consumption (θc = #c = 0). Line marked by circles: MPMF, CD production
function, and deep habits in consumption (θc = 0.86 and #c = 0.85). Line marked by stars: MPMF, CES production
function (σ = 0.40) and deep habits in consumption. Responses of all variables but the unemployment rate are in percentage
deviations from steady state. For the unemployment rate, absolute changes in percentage points are reported.
This can be regarded as a measure of the unemployment multiplier. This exercise is conducted under the
assumption that the fiscal measure is fully financed by lump-sum taxes.11
As a benchmark, we consider the effects of a government spending expansion in the neoclassical flexible-
price benchmark with MPMF under the assumption that the production function is Cobb-Douglas, and
that no deep habits in private and government consumption are formed. The results are in line with most
11When lump-sum taxes are in place the timing of tax collection does not matter as the Ricardian equivalence holds. In
other words, debt-financed fiscal expansions would yield the same effects.
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of the recent theoretical fiscal stimulus literature: a fiscal expansion triggers a negative wealth effect, via
an increase in tax obligations, that curbs consumption and boosts labour supply. In the context of MPMF,
this has a negative effect on households’ reservation wage and a smaller positive effect on firms’ reservation
wage. As a result, the share of the firms in the surplus from wage bargaining increases, which translates
into more vacancies being posted, a tighter labour market, a reduction in equilibrium unemployment, and
a fall in the real wage. The absorption of resources by the government is such that also private investment
is crowded out and the real interest rate rises. As standard in flexible-price neoclassical models with
imperfect competition, the price mark-up over the marginal cost remains constant. Another standard
result – coming instead from the use of the Cobb-Douglas production function – is that capital and labour
shares of income are also constant.
From a quantitative point of view, results are similar to existing contributions such as Campolmi et al.
(2010) and Monacelli et al. (2010): government spending expansions yield output multipliers well below
one (around 0.5 for our calibration) and almost negligible negative effects on unemployment.
The results in the flexible-price benchmark model contrast with much of the recent empirical literature,
both from a quantitative and from a qualitative point of view. On the quantitative side, recent empirical
estimates of the output multiplier are generally greater than those predicted by DSGE models with no
zero-lower-bound constraints. On the size of the unemployment multiplier Monacelli et al. (2010) provide
an estimate at peak of -0.6 percentage points after ten quarters, which per se may be regarded to be small,
but it is an order of magnitude bigger than the multiplier predicted by the flexible-price benchmark with
MPMF.12 On the qualitative side, there is also empirical evidence that government spending expansions
crowd in private consumption and boost both hours worked and the real wage (see Pappa, 2005; Gali et al.,
2007; Pappa, 2009; Fragetta and Melina, 2011, among others). In addition, Monacelli and Perotti (2008)
and Canova and Pappa (2011) find evidence for a fall in the price mark-up following a fiscal expansion.
4.2 Deep habits
The introduction of deep habits in consumption yields a substantial improvement on the performance of
the DSGE model in matching these empirical findings, even in the absence of price and/or wage rigidities
and the zero-lower bound.13
In Figure 3 we show that by introducing deep habits in our model, not only are we able to match
a number of empirical facts from a qualitative point of view, but we are also able to obtain output and
unemployment multipliers closer to those computed in the SVAR literature, under a plausible calibration.
A government spending expansion, also under deep habits, causes a negative wealth effect. However,
the drop in the mark-up, which in turn implies higher future sales, translates into more vacancy posting
through the job creation condition. The higher labour market tightness implies a greater fall in the
unemployment rate. This coexists not only with an increase in the intensive margin (hours worked) but
12Brückner and Pappa (2010) report evidence according to which unemployment may also rise in response to a government
spending shock and match this finding by including the labour-force participation rate into a New-Keynesian model through
an insider/outsider mechanism.
13In the seminal work by Ravn et al. (2006), they already illustrate that a government spending expansion yields a
crowding-in of private consumption as opposed to a crowding-out, when deep habits in private and public consumption are
introduced into an otherwise standard flexible-price model with imperfect competition. In addition, Di Pace and Faccini
(2011) find that deep habits in consumption have the property of considerably magnifying unemployment volatility also in
a model with flexible wages, proposing a solution to Pissarides (2009)’s unemployment puzzle.
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also with an increase in the real wage. The increase in the real wage is made possible by the greater increase
in the firm’s reservation wage, which induces a rise in the bargained wage. The increase in equilibrium
wage makes leisure relatively more expensive and causes a substitution effect towards consumption that
more than compensate the negative wealth effect. As a result, consumption rises.
With a Cobb-Douglas production function and our baseline calibration the resulting output multiplier
is around 1.7, a number in the high range of empirical estimates. The peak unemployment multiplier is
-0.27 percentage points, which is of the same order of magnitude of the estimates reported by Monacelli
et al. (2010), as opposed to the model without deep habits.
In sum, deep habits in private and public consumption are a useful addition to the DSGE model because
through them – even in the absence of any sources of nominal stickiness and without the imposition of the
ZLB – (i) the output multiplier of government spending can be considerably magnified up to values in the
range of empirical estimates; (ii) the unemployment multiplier can be brought from near-zero to values
of the same order of magnitude found in the data; (iii) private consumption is crowded in by government
spending; (iv) the price mark-up drops; and (v) the real wage rises together with hours worked.
In the NK literature the fall in the mark-up and the increase in the real wage are matched to a certain
extent by including price and/or wage stickiness. However, NK models manage to get only an initial
positive response in the real wage – while the empirical literature finds a persistent positive increase –
and the fall in the mark-up is not generally enough to push aggregate supply upward to such an extent
that the fiscal multiplier is dramatically magnified. Consumption is still crowded out unless either (i)
a non-additively separable utility function is adopted and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of
consumption is set to be low (i.e. σc, its inverse, is high) entailing strong intratemporal substitution effects
between consumption and leisure (see for example Linnemann, 2006; Monacelli et al., 2010) or (ii) it has to
be assumed that an implausibly high share of consumers show a “rule-of-thumb” non-optimising behaviour
(Gali et al., 2007).
4.3 CES production function
The empirical literature has not reached a consensus on the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy. Nonethe-
less, if one wants to operate a synthesis of available empirical estimates on output and unemployment
expenditures multipliers, it seems fair to conclude that, when the government purchases more goods and
services from the private sector, this may yield a sizeable increase in real output, while the effect on new
job creation is likely to be small (Brückner and Pappa (2010) claim that the effect may even be negative).
In this subsection we show that if the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour, σ, is
allowed to drop from 1 (CD case) to values in the range of estimated values, this empirical regularity can
be explained within a DSGE model with MPMF and deep habits in private and government consumption.
Estimates of σ are between 0.3 and 0.6 (Klump et al., 2007; Chirinko, 2008; Cantore et al., 2011, 2010a;
León-Ledesma et al., 2010).
In Figure 3 we show that the introduction of the CES production function – obtained by setting σ = 0.4
– marginally diminishes the output multiplier to almost 1.4 (which is about 83% of the value obtained
in the CD case), while the unemployment multiplier drops to -0.18 percentage points (about 67% of the
value obtained in the CD case). In addition, factor shares react to the government spending expansion.14
14In the exercises we perform in this subsection and the rest of the paper, different responses of unemployment in absolute
13
5 10 15 20
0
0.5
1
1.5
Output                
5 10 15 20
−0.25
−0.2
−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
Unemployment (p.p.)   
5 10 15 20
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Hours worked          
5 10 15 20
0
1
2
3
4
5
Real wage             
5 10 15 20
0
1
2
3
4
5
Vacancies             
5 10 15 20
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
Labour market tightness
 
 
σ → 1
σ = 0.80
σ = 0.60
σ = 0.40
σ = 0.20
Figure 4: Sensitivity of the results to different values of the elasticity of substitution between capital and
labour, σ.
Note: Fiscal policy: government spending expansion (1% of output, lump-sum taxes, balanced budget). Model: RBC with
Mortensen-Pissarides Matching Friction (MPMF), deep habits in consumption (θc = 0.86 and "c = 0.85).
The unequal effects on the output and unemployment multipliers depend on the fact that lowering the
elasticity of substitution in the CES production function is equivalent to assuming that the technology
is closer to the Leontief case, i.e. capital and labour are more complements than substitutes. In Figure
4 we show that, as σ is allowed to assume values lower than one, given that capital is unable to change
instantaneously in response to the fiscal expansion, firms have smaller incentives to create new jobs through
vacancy posting. However, both the negative wealth effect (coming from the absorption of resources by
the government) and the substitution of leisure with consumption (coming from the decline in the mark-up
due to the presence of deep habits) still act in the same direction of causing a substantial increase in the
supply of hours of work.
Similarly to the comparison made above for the fiscal multipliers, we can quantitatively compare the
impact responses of equilibrium hours worked, wage and vacancies obtained in the CD case (σ → 1) with
the CES case, i.e. the case in which σ takes a value in the range of empirical estimates (σ = 0.4). With a
CES the response of hours worked is around 80% of the response obtained with a CD, while the responses
of the real wage and vacancies with a CES are around 62% and 67% of the responses delivered by a CD,
respectively.
In Figure 5 we plot the peak elasticity of the unemployment rate to output in response to a government
deviations, obtained by changing some parameter values, are comparable as we ensure that steady-state unemployment is
the same across calibrations. This is allowed by the calibration strategy itself, which entails targeting a specific job finding
probability p¯ and setting the job separation rate λ. In fact, steady-state unemployment, through the Beveridge curve, is a
function of only p¯ and λ, i.e. n¯ = p¯/(λ+ p¯).
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Figure 5: Peak elasticity of the unemployment rate to real output changes in response to a government
spending expansion at different levels of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour.
Note: Fiscal policy: government spending expansion (1% of output, lump-sum taxes, balanced budget). Model: RBC with
Mortensen-Pissarides Matching Friction (MPMF), deep habits in consumption (θc = 0.86 and "c = 0.85).
spending expansion at different levels of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour. When
σ drops from 1 (CD case) to the lower bound of the range of empirical estimates (σ = 0.3), the peak
elasticity of the unemployment rate to output drops by around 20%.
In sum, if the technology operating in the economy is represented by a CES production function, as σ
falls, the growth of output fostered by a government spending expansion is sustained relatively more by an
increase in the intensive margin (current employees work longer hours) than an increase in the extensive
margin (new job creation).15
4.4 Debt-financed fiscal policy and distortionary taxation
In order to introduce government debt and distortionary taxes we set the steady-state tax rates on con-
sumption, the labour income and the return on capital to the values reported by Christiano et al. (2010),
i.e. τ c = 0.05, τw = 0.24, and τk = 0.32. In addition, we let the government accumulate public debt, while
tax rates react to government debt according to a feedback rule. We set the response coefficient of the tax
rates to government debt ρXB = 0.02, the value used by Monacelli et al. (2010). Figure 6 shows that the
introduction of distortionary taxes alters the magnitude of the responses of output and unemployment,
but unemployment is affected more. Such reductions in the multipliers are (i) due to the distortion on
equilibrium employment triggered by the increase in the tax rates following the fiscal expansion and (ii)
to the dynamics of the fiscal instruments implied by the feedback rule. In fact, as consumption and the
sources of income are taxed more, the tax-adjusted value of non-work activity increases. This reduces the
total surplus of employment. In addition, as the imposed feedback rule implies a gradual return of the tax
instruments to their steady state value, this implies also postponement of work activities.
15In the appendix we also show that, as the technology tends to Leontief, the calibration of the bargaining parameter
becomes increasingly less important for the equilibrium outcome. Rowthorn (1999) also emphasises the role of CES technology
with an elasticity σ below unity for explaining European unemployment persistence despite moves towards greater labour
market flexibility as captured by an increase in the firm’s bargaining power in our model.
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Figure 6: Sensitivity of output and unemployment multipliers to the introduction of distortionary taxation
and government debt.
Note: Fiscal policy: government spending expansion (1% of output, distortionary taxes, partially debt-financed fiscal policy).
Model: RBC with Mortensen-Pissarides Matching Friction (MPMF), deep habits in consumption (θc = 0.86 and "c = 0.85),
and CES production function (σ = 0.40). Responses of output are in percentage deviations from steady state. For the
unemployment rate, absolute changes in percentage points are reported.
4.5 Jobless recovery
In this subsection we investigate the low-job-creation feature of the fiscal stimulus in a case in which the
latter takes place at a recession time. In accordance with the findings of subsection 4.3, we show that a
lower-than-one factor elasticity of substitution delivers a more jobless outcome as the output contraction
is mitigated more by an increase in the hours of work than by vacancy posting and job creation.
For illustrative purposes, we simulate a recession by means of a negative technology shock. Figure 7
shows the responses of output and unemployment in the cases in which the production function is a CD
and a CES with σ = 0.4 (bold lines in the first and second row of Figure 7). The size of the shock is
chosen in order to make output contract by around 7.5% from steady state at peak when the production
function is a CES. This is approximately the size of the deviation of the US output from potential in the
second quarter of 2009 (the trough of the great recession according to the National Bureau of Economic
Research), using the series available in ALFRED (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis). The same shock
makes output contract less (6%) when the production function is CD. In addition the model predicts that
unemployment increases at peak by more than 4 percentage points in the CES case and by 2.5 percentage
points in the CD case. In the same charts, we show the mitigatory effects of a fiscal stimulus (dashed
lines). In particular, we proxy the fiscal stimulus with a government spending expansion of 5% of output,
approximately the expenditure expansion foreseen by the ARRA.16
16Blinder and Zandi (2010, table 10) report that the total more-than $ 1-trillion 2009 stimulus package in the US was split
into a total of $ 682 billion for spending increases and $ 383 billion for tax cuts. Given that the 2009 US GDP at current
prices was $ 14 trillion, the spending increases were 4.9% of GDP.
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Figure 7: A fiscal stimulus in a recession.
Note: Model: RBC with Mortensen-Pissarides Matching Friction (MPMF) and deep habits in consumption (θc = 0.86 and
"c = 0.85). Recession driven by a negative technology shock that leads to a peak output contraction of around 7.5% from
steady state with a CES production function. Fiscal stimulus: government spending expansion of 5% of output; lump-sum
taxes; balanced budget. First row (CD): simulated output and unemployment responses in the absence and with the fiscal
stimulus under a Cobb-Douglas technology (σ → 1). Second row (CES): responses under a CES technology (σ = 0.40).
Third row (CD and CES): ratios of impulse responses with and without the fiscal stimulus under CE and CES technologies.
It is evident that while the fiscal stimulus has similar effects in terms of output stabilisation, unemployment
stabilisation is considerably less pronounced under the CES production function. The third row of Figure
7 plots the ratios of the impulse responses with the fiscal stimulus activated with respect to the impulse
responses with no fiscal stimulus, in the two alternative cases of CD and CES. In the experiment proposed
here, the output contraction in the presence of the fiscal stimulus is around 40% of the contraction in the
no-fiscal policy scenario under CD and around 25% under CES. The rise in unemployment in the presence
of the fiscal stimulus is instead 50% less pronounced under CD and around 20% under CES. In other
words, at a recession time, the model with a CES production function predicts that a government spending
expansion fosters a considerably more jobless recovery. As explained in Subsection 4.3, the intution is to
be found in a higher degree of factor complementarity, which is in line with empirical estimates, coupled
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with the inability of capital to react quickly to shocks and the costly nature of job creation. Given that
capital is unable to change instantaneously, if capital and labour are complementary enough, in response
to the fiscal expansion firms have smaller incentives to create new jobs through vacancy posting, which is
a costly process. However, both the negative wealth effect (coming from the absorption of resources by the
government) and the substitution of leisure with consumption (coming from the decline in the mark-up
due to the presence of deep habits) still act in the same direction of causing an increase in the supply
of hours of work per employee, which is sufficient to foster a tangible increase in output. Therefore, the
mitigatory effects of the fiscal stimulus on the output contraction are driven relatively more by the fact
that current employees work longer hours rather than because of the creation of more jobs.
5 The fiscal stimulus in a NK extension of the model
This section offers a new-Keynesian (NK) extension of the model that includes sticky prices and monetary
policy. Price stickiness is introduced as in Rotemberg (1982), i.e. by assuming that changing prices costs
resources17 while monetary policy is set by imposing a Taylor rule
log
(
Rnt
R¯n
)
= ρr log
(
Rnt−1
R¯n
)
+ (1− ρr)
[
ρpi log
(
Πt
Π¯
)
+ ρy log
(
Yt
Y¯
)]
, (10)
where Rnt is the nominal interest rate, Πt is the gross inflation rate, and ρr, ρpi and ρy are parameters. A
Fisher equation links the ex-post real interest rate Rt+1 to the nominal interest rate:
Rt+1 = Et
[
Rnt
Πt+1
]
. (11)
5.1 Results
Woodford (2011) shows that adding sticky prices into an otherwise standard DSGE model enhances the
effects of a government spending expansion. Jacob (2011) argues that if price stickiness is added into
a model with deep habit formation the countercyclical movement that the government spending shock
induces in the mark-up is milder, that private consumption may still be crowded out as in traditional
RBC and NK models and, consequently, the output multiplier becomes small. We show that, with deep
habit formation, the addition of price stickiness may indeed soften the effects of a government spending
expansion. However, we also find that (i) for an empirically plausible degree of deep habit formation and
price stickiness the effects of a fiscal stimulus in terms of consumption and investment crowding-ins, the
decline in the mark-up, the increase in the real wage, and the sizes of the output and unemployment
multipliers are quite robust to the introduction of price stickiness; and (ii) Jacob’s result (as evident also
in the robustness exercises of his paper) is dependent on the assumption that the Taylor rule has a strong
monetary response to the output gap that makes the nominal interest rate counteract the output expansion
to an extent that the effects of the fiscal expansion are offset.
17The use of price-adjustment costs as in Rotemberg (1982) is shared by virtually all papers featuring deep habits in
consumption as it is a rather straight-forward addition from a technical point of view. By contrast using Calvo-type contracts
introduces firm-specific habit effects which are more difficult to handle.
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Figure 8: A government spending expansion (1% of output, lump-sum taxes, balanced budget) in a model
augmented with Mortensen-Pissarides Matching and deep habits in consumption: flexible vs. sticky prices.
As a result, it is not price stickiness per se that subverts the effects of a government spending expansion,
but an aggressive monetary response that goes exactly in the opposite direction of output growth, which
is the primary goal of the fiscal stimulus itself.
Figure 8 shows the effects of an expansion of government expenditures at different degrees of price
stickiness in two alternative scenarios. First, in the top panel of Figure 8, we assume that the nominal
interest rate exhibits persistence in line with the data (ρr = 0.8) and that the monetary authority reacts
only to inflation (ρpi = 2)18 and not to the output gap (ρy = 0). We explore increasing degrees of price
stickiness, ξ. A ξ = 29.41 corresponds to a Calvo contract average duration of around 3 quarters for our
calibration.19 When we introduce price stickiness, the effects of the fiscal expansion become softened by
18Both parameter values are the posterior estimates found by Smets and Wouters (2007).
19Jacob (2011) shows that for a given value of Rotemberg adjustment costs, the introduction of deep habits reduces the
response of prices to the marginal cost and hence it is impossible to compare the deep habits New-Keynesian Phillips Curve
(NKPC) slope to the Calvo analogue. Hence, following Jacob (2011), we interpret the slope of the standard forward-looking
NKPC in quarterly terms. Namely, the log-linearised NKPC assumes the following form: Πˆt = βEtΠˆt+1 + κMˆCt, where
κ = η−1
ξ
under Rotemberg pricing and κ = (1−βξ
c)(1−ξc)
ξc
under Calvo contracts, where ξc is the Calvo parameter that
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the decrease in the rate of inflation. This occurs if the shift in the aggregate supply, due to the presence
of a high level of deep habits, is relatively strong given the shift in the aggregate demand due to the
government spending expansion. However, the effects of a government spending expansion are similar to
those obtained in the flexible-price. In the lower panel of Figure 8, we set a Taylor rule featuring a strong
response to the output gap (ρy = 0.5). In this case if prices are sticky, the nominal interest rate reacts
positively to the rise in output despite the fall in inflation, the real interest rate reaction becomes positive
and offsets the effects of the fiscal expansion.
Figure 9 shows the impact responses (peak responses for unemployment) (i) at different levels of mon-
etary policy response to the output gap and (ii) at different degrees of deep habit formation. Surfaces
show that, even at high degrees of deep habit formation, a substantial monetary policy response to the
output gap may offset the expansionary effects of a government spending expansion. In particular, un-
employment may also rise and consumption crowded out if ρy is above 0.4, while the output multiplier
falls below one with a ρy above 0.6. Is the observed response parameter ρy so high and should it be so
from an optimal policy perspective? In the empirical DSGE model literature, estimates of the value of ρy
are typically low. For example in Smets and Wouters (2007) in a standard NK models with superficial
habit, no unemployment and Cobb-Douglas production, estimated using US data by Bayesian methods
over 1984:1-2004:1, a posterior mean corresponding to ρy = 0.08 is obtained. These findings are typical
of this literature. In the optimal policy literature optimised interest rate rules using a welfare criteria
also find a weak long-run response of the interest rate to the output gap; for example, Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2007) find ρy = 0.1 and Levin et al. (2006), Levine et al. (2008) and Levine et al. (2011) all find
its welfare-improving contribution to be so small as to be ignored in their optimised rules.20
6 Concluding remarks
We have analysed the effects of a government spending expansion in a DSGE model with Mortensen-
Pissarides labour market frictions, deep habits in private and public consumption and a constant-elasticity-
of-substitution (CES) production function.
The combination of deep habits and CES technology is crucial. The presence of deep habits enables
the model to deliver output and unemployment multipliers in the high range of recent empirical estimates,
while an elasticity of substitution in the range of available estimates allows it to produce a scenario
compatible with the observed jobless recovery. In other words, factor complementarity proves to be a
determinant of the jobless outcome of a fiscal stimulus.
Further, if sticky prices are added into the model, an accommodative monetary policy with respect
to the output gap, plays an important role for the size of fiscal multipliers and, more generally, for the
expansionary effects of the fiscal stimulus.
determines the average quarterly duration of contracts 11−ξc . Given a certain ξ, it is straightforward to induce the implied
analogous contract duration in the Calvo world.
20These results abstract from active fiscal stabilisation policy. Our findings suggest that when fiscal rules are added their
efficacy would require an even weaker response of interest rates to the output gap. This is confirmed in Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2007). Indeed they devote a whole subsection to “the importance of (monetary policy) not responding to output”.
For a study of optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a new Keynesian model with deep habit see Leith et al. (2009). In both
these models, there is no unemployment and Cobb-Douglas production is assumed, so important features of our set-up are
missing. Nonetheless their optimised interest rate rules in conjunction with fiscal stabilisation of debt also feature a weak
long-run response to the output gap.
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Figure 9: Sensitivity of impact responses to the deep habit parameter θc and the monetary response to
the output gap ρy.
The results presented in this paper are an important starting point for future research: (i) it would
be interesting to empirically evaluate the building blocks of the model via the comparison of the marginal
likelihood in a Bayesian estimation setting; (ii) given the binding ZLB for the monetary policy rate in the
latest recession, it would be worth investigating to what extent this features affect our results;21 (iii) the
model is well-suited for the design of optimal fiscal and monetary rules. In particular, given the sensitivity
of the results to the monetary response, examining optimised Taylor rules would be a useful exercise.
21These are basically two ways of introducing a nominal interest rate ZLB. In the deterministic setting of this paper the
Taylor rule is allowed to remain in force as long as the ZLB is not reached. When this does happen a residual adjustment is
added to the rule that avoids a negative interest rate (see, for example, Christiano et al. (2010)). In a stochastic setting a
Monte-Carlo approach is needed that uses the previous technique for each stochastic draw (see Coenen et al. (2004)). When
it comes to optimal policy a desirable property of a monetary rule is that the ZLB is only reached very infrequently. This
outcome is achieved by raising the steady-state inflation rate and penalising the interest rate variability in an optimal fashion
– see Levine et al. (2008).
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Appendix
A Full model derivation
A.1 Search-match technology
The labour market is characterised by standard Mortensen-Pissarides search-match frictions in which
firms fill jobs by posting vacancies. Let nt be the number of employed workers and total population
be normalised to one. Conventionally, we assume that the number of new hires or “matches”, Mt, is a
Cobb-Douglas function of unemployed workers, ut ≡ 1 − nt, and vacancies, vt, Mt = κuωt v
1−ω
t , where κ
represents the efficiency of the matching process and ω ∈ (0, 1) is the elasticity of the number of matches
to unemployment. Thus, the current probability that a worker finds a match is pt =
Mt
ut
= k
(
ut
vt
)ω−1
=
kθ1−ωt , where θt ≡
vt
ut
is commonly labelled as the labour market “tightness”. The more vacancies are
posted, given a certain level of unemployment, the tighter the labour market is said to be. Analogously,
the current probability that a firm fills a vacancy is given by qt =
Mt
vt
= kθ−ωt . Both firms and workers
take pt and qt as given. The two probabilities are linked by p(θt) = θtq(θt) and q′(θt) < 0, p′(θt) > 0 .
The law of motion of aggregate employment can be written as:
nt+1 = Mt + (1− λ)nt, (A.1)
where λ is an exogenous job destruction rate.
A.2 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of identical households indexed by j ∈ [0, 1] who have preferences
over a continuum of differentiated consumption varieties indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Household members can be
either employed or unemployed. The employed at firm i ∈ [0, 1] earn a real wage wit and suffer disutility
from working, while the unemployed receive an unemployment benefit wu. Following Ravn et al. (2006),
we assume that households exhibit external deep habit formation in consumption, i.e. habits are formed
on the average consumption level of each variety of good. Let njt be the number of employed household
members, and hjt be the hours that each employed individual devotes to work activities. Then, the total
hours of labour supplied by household j is N jt ≡ n
j
th
j
t . Let the total number of household members be
normalised to one, so that njt can be interpreted as an employment rate. Let also the total time available
to individuals be normalised to one. Then, the leisure time for the employed members of household
j is ljt ≡ 1 − h
j
t , while the unemployed “enjoy” leisure l
j
t = 1.
1 Then, the representative household’s
instantaneous utility function is given by:
U((Xct )
j , njt , 1− h
j
t) = n
j
tU((X
c
t )
j , 1− hjt ) + (1− n
j
t)U((X
c
t )
j , 1), (A.2)
where (Xct )
j is a habit-adjusted composite of differentiated consumption goods:
1We also assume that workers can perfectly insure themselves against idiosyncratic shocks, i.e. that income is pooled
between the employed and the unemployed.
i
(Xct )
j =
[ˆ 1
0
(Cjit − θ
cScit−1)
1− 1
η di
] 1
1− 1η
, (A.3)
parameter η is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution across varieties, θc ∈ (0, 1) is the degree of deep
habit formation on each variety, and Scit−1 denotes the stock of external habit in the consumption of good
i. The stock of external habit Scit evolves over time according to the following law of motion:
Scit = #
cScit−1 + (1− #
c)Cit, (A.4)
where #c ∈ (0, 1) measures the speed of adjustment of the stock of external habit in the consumption of
variety i to changes in the average level of consumption of the same variety.
For household j, the Beveridge curve is given by:
njt+1 = (1− λ)n
j
t + p(θt)(1 − n
j
t). (A.5)
Let us also assume that household j has Kjt capital holdings, which evolve according to the following
law of motion:
Kjt+1 = (1− δ)K
j
t + I
j
t
[
1− S
(
Ijt
Ijt−1
)]
, (A.6)
where δ is the capital depreciation rate, Ijt is investment taking place at time t, and S(·) represents an
investment adjustment cost satisfying S(1) = S′(1) = 0 and S′′(1) > 0. We assume that investment
is also a composite of differentiated goods; however it does not exhibit deep habit formation, i.e. Ijt =[´ 1
0
(
Ijit
)1− 1
η
di
] 1
1− 1η
. Expenditure minimisation leads to the optimal level of demand of investment goods
for each variety i:
Ijit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
Ijt , (A.7)
where Pt ≡
[´ 1
0 P
1−η
it di
] 1
1−η
is the nominal price index.
Each household j solves a two-stage problem. Letting Pit be the price of variety i, they first minimise
total expenditure
´ 1
0 PitC
j
itdi over C
j
it, subject to (A.3). This leads to the optimal level of demand for each
variety i for a given composite:
Cjit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
(Xct )
j + θScit−1, (A.8)
which is characterised by a price-elastic component and a price-inelastic component.
By multiplying both sides of equation (A.8) by Pit, integrating across varieties, and using the defini-
tion of nominal price index, we obtain the nominal value of the habit-adjusted consumption composite
Pt(Xct )
j =
´ 1
0 Pit
(
Cjit − θS
c
it−1
)
di, which can be rearranged to write the household’s real consumption
expenditure Cjt as a function of the consumption composite and the stock of habit: C
j
t = (X
c
t )
j + Ωt,
where Ωt ≡ θc
´ 1
0
Pit
Pt
Scit−1di.
The second stage of the problem faced by household j at time t is choosing paths for the habit-adjusted
ii
consumption composite (Xct )
j , capital Kjt+1, investment I
j
t , and government real bond holdings B
j
t , which
pay the gross real interest rate Rt+1 one period ahead, to maximise lifetime utility:
Hjt
(
njt ,K
j
t , B
j
t
)
≡ max
(Xct )
j ,Kjt+1,I
j
t
{
U
(
(Xct )
j , njt , 1− h
j
t
)
+βEtH
j
t
(
njt+1,K
j
t+1, B
j
t+1
) }, (A.9)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, subject to the law of motion of capital (A.6) and the following
budget constraint:
(
1 + τCt
) (
(Xct )
j + Ωt
)
+ Ijt + τt +B
j
t =
(
1− τWt
)
njth
j
twit + (1− n
j
t)wu
+
(
1− τKt
)
RKt K
j
t +RtB
j
t−1 +
ˆ 1
0
Jitdi, (A.10)
where τCt , τ
W
t and τ
K
t are tax rates on consumption, labour income and the return on capital, respectively;
τt is a lump-sum tax; RKt is the rental rate of capital; and
´ 1
0 Jitdi represents firms’ profits.
The first-order condition with respect to the consumption composite (Xct )
j implies that the Lagrange
multiplier on the household’s budget constraint (A.10) is equal to Λjt =
Ujx,t
1+τCt
, where U jx,t is the marginal
utility of the consumption composite. Let ΛjtQ
j
t be the multiplier on the capital accumulation equation
(A.6), and Qjt represent Tobin’s Q. Then, the first-order condition with respect to capital, K
j
t+1, yields
the following Euler equation:
Qjt = Et
{
Djt,t+1
[(
1− τkt+1
)
RKt+1 + (1− δ)Q
j
t+1
]}
, (A.11)
where Djt,t+1 ≡ β
Ujx,t+1
Ujx,t
1+τCt
1+τct+1
is the stochastic discount factor. The first order condition with respect to
investment Ijt yields the following:

Qjt
(
1− S
(
Ijt
Ijt−1
)
− S′
(
Ijt
Ijt−1
)
Ijt
Ijt−1
)
+Et
(
Djt,t+1Q
j
t+1S
′
(
Ijt+1
Ijt
)(
Ijt+1
Ijt
)2)


= 1; (A.12)
while the first order condition with respect to real government bonds implies:
1 = Et
[
Djt,t+1Rt+1
]
. (A.13)
Employment njt is determined as a result of a Nash wage bargaining, as described below. The surplus
of the household in the bargaining, Swjt , can be computed as the value of having an additional household
member employed. By using the envelope condition for employment, we obtain:
(Swt )
j = Hjnt
(
njt ,K
j
t , B
j
t
)
=
(
1− τWt
)
wkth
j
t −
[
wu −
U jn,t
U jx,t
]
+ (1− λ− p(θt))Et
[
Dt,t+1(S
w
t+1)
j
]
, (A.14)
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which implies that the surplus from employment for the household is increasing in the net labour income
plus the expected value from being employed the next period and decreasing in the opportunity costs.
Finally, hours of work hjt are chosen in a way that makes the bargain efficient, as again shown below.
A.3 Government
In each period t, the government allocates spending PtGt over differentiated goods sold by retailers in a
monopolistic market to maximise the quantity of a habit-adjusted composite good:
Xgt =
[ˆ 1
0
(Git − θ
cSgit−1)
1− 1
η di
] 1
1− 1η
, (A.15)
subject to the budget constraint
´ 1
0 PitGit ≤ PtGt, where η is the elasticity of substitution across varieties,
Sgit−1 denotes the stock of habits for government expenditures, which evolves as:
Sgit = #
cSgit−1 + (1− #
c)Git. (A.16)
At the optimum:
Git =
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
Xgt + θ
cSgit−1. (A.17)
Aggregate real government consumption Gt is set as an exogenous process:
log
(
Gt
G¯
)
= ρG log
(
Gt−1
G¯
)
+ %gt , (A.18)
where G¯ is the steady-state level of government spending, ρG is an autoregressive parameter and %
g
t is a
mean zero, i.i.d. random shock with standard deviation σG.
The government budget constraint will then read as follows:
Bt = RtBt−1 +Gt + (1− nt)wu − τt − τ
C
t Ct − τ
W
t wtntht − τ
K
t R
k
tKt, (A.19)
while taxes are set according to the following feedback rule :
log
(
Xt
X¯
)
= ρX log
(
Xt−1
X¯
)
+ ρXB
Bt−1
Yt−1
+ %Xt , Xt = (τ, τ
c, τw, τk), (A.20)
where ρX are autoregressive coefficients; X¯ are steady state values; %Xt are serially uncorrelated, normally
distributed shocks with zero mean and standard deviations σX , and ρXB is the responsiveness of tax X
to the debt-to-GDP ratio.
We set steady-state government debt equal to zero in steady state, implying also that the government
runs a balanced budget in steady state. To explore the benchmark scenario of lump-sum taxes and fully
financed lump-sum taxation, it suffices to set the tax rates and government debts constantly equal to zero,
Bt = τCt = τ
W
t = τ
K
t = 0, and τt = Gt + (1− nt)wu.
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A.4 Firms
A continuum of monopolistically competitive firms indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] uses capital, Kit, and labour,
Nit ≡ nithit to produce differentiated goods Yit, which are sold at price pit ≡ Pit/Pt. The technology
used in the production process is represented by F ((ZK)tKit, (ZN)tnithit), where (ZK)t and (ZN)t, are
a capital-augmenting technology shock and a labour-augmenting technology shock, respectively.
Employment at firm i evolves over time according to the following law of motion:
nit+1 = (1− λ)nit + q(θt)vit, (A.21)
where θt is treated as exogenous by the firm.
In addition, the firm faces hiring costs, HCit, of posting vit vacancies and employing nit workers given
by:
HCit = g(zit)nit ; g
′, g′′ ≥ 0, (A.22)
where zit ≡
(
vit
nit
)
is the vacancy ratio.2
The firm rents capital services from households at a rental rate RKt , takes employment nit as given at
time t, and maximises the following flow of discounted profits:
Jt(nit) = Et
{
∞∑
s=0
Dt,t+s
[
pit (Cit+s +Git+s + Iit+s)−HCit+s
−wit+snit+shkt+s −RKt+sKit+s
]}
, (A.23)
with respect to Kit+s, nit+s, vit+s,Cit+s, Scit+s, Git+s, S
g
it+s and pit+s ≡ Pit+s/Pit+s subject to (A.21),
(A.22), the demand for good i in the form of private consumption Cit, (A.8), government consumption
Git, (A.17), and investment, (A.7), the laws of motion of the stocks of habit for households, (A.4), and
the government, (A.16), and the firm’s resource constraint:
Cit+s +Git+s + p
−η
it It+s = F ((ZK)tKit, (ZN)tnithit) = Yit. (A.24)
The corresponding first-order conditions for this problem are:
RKt = MCtFK,it, (A.25)
µit = (MCtFN,it − wit)hit + g
′(zit)zit − g(zit) + (1− λ)Et [Dt,t+1µit+1] , (A.26)
g′ (zit) = q(θt)Et [Dt,t+1µit+1] , (A.27)
νct ,= pit −MCt + (1− $
c)λct , (A.28)
λct = EtDt,t+1(θ
cνct+1 + $
cλct+1), (A.29)
2Note in the original Pissarides model g(zt) = czt so that hiring costs per vacancy posted are constant.
v
νgt = pit −MCt + (1− "
c)λgt , (A.30)
λgt = EtDt,t+1(θ
cνgt+1 + "
cλgt+1), (A.31)
Cit +Git + (1− η)p
−η
it It + ηMCtp
−η−1
it It − ην
c
t p
−η−1
it X
c
t − ην
g
t p
−η−1
it X
g
t = 0. (A.32)
Variables MCt, µit, νct , λ
c
t , ν
g
t , λ
g
t are the Lagrange multipliers associated to constraints (A.24), (A.21),
(A.8), (A.4), (A.17), (A.16), respectively. In particular, MCt is the shadow value of output and represents
the firm’s real marginal cost.
If we denote the nominal marginal cost with MCnt , the gross mark-up charged by final good firm i can
be defined as Mit ≡ Pit/MCnt =
Pit
Pt
/MC
n
t
Pt
= pit/MCt. In the symmetric equilibrium all final good firms
charge the same price, Pit = Pt, hence the relative price is unity, pit = 1. It follows that, in the symmetric
equilibrium, the mark-up is simply the inverse of the marginal cost.
By combining equations (A.28), (A.30) and (A.32), substituting for the demands for Cit and Git, (A.8)
and (A.17), and rearranging, the optimal pricing decision in the symmetric equilibrium can be written as
follows:

 (X
c
t +X
g
t + It)
[
1− ηη−1MCt
]
+ ηη−1(1− "
c) [λctX
c
t + λ
g
tX
g
t ]−
θc
η−1
(
Sct−1 + S
g
t−1
)

 = 0. (A.33)
The surplus of the firm from employment at the margin is represented by µit:
Sfit = µit, (A.34)
while FK,it represents the marginal product of capital, and FN,it represents the marginal product of labour.
Note that (A.26) uses the fact that the product of an employee is given by Fn,it = FN,ithit at the margin.
Iterating (A.26) one period forward and combining it with (A.27) yields the following vacancy equation
or job creation condition :
g′ (zit)
q(θt)
= Et [Dt,t+1µit+1)]
= Et
{
Dt,t+1
[
(MCtFN,it+1 − wit+1)hit+1 + g′ (zit+1) zit+1
−g(zit+1) + (1− λ)
g′(zit+1)
q(θt+1)
]}
. (A.35)
Clearly, in the absence of hiring costs, g(zit+1) = g′(zit+1) = 0, (A.35) becomes MCtFN,it = wit, the
competitive labour market outcome.
A.5 Wage bargaining and hours worked
Let & ∈ [0, 1] denote the firm’s bargaining power and Swit be the surplus of a household negotiating with
firm i. Then, Nash bargaining implies that the real wage maximise the weighted product of the worker’s
and the firm’s surpluses from employment:
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max
wit
(Swit )
1−!
(
Sfit
)!
(A.36)
The solution to problem (A.36) yields the following surplus-splitting rule:
Swit =
1− !
!
(1− τwt )S
f
it. (A.37)
The introduction of the distortionary labour tax makes the workers actual bargaining power fluctuate
along the business cycle and reduces the share of the workers in the bargaining itself. Substituting for
(A.14), (A.34), and (A.26) into (A.37) and rearranging yields the following wage equation:
withit = (1− !)
[
MCtFN,ithit − g(zit) + g
′(zit)zit + θtg
′(zit)
]
+ !

wu − Un,tUx,t
1− τwt

 . (A.38)
Condition (A.38) implies that the wage paid to the employee is a weighted average of the marginal product
of the employee plus the savings from job continuation, net of the cost of posting vacancies, and the
opportunity cost of working, which is increasing in the unemployment benefits, the disutility of working
activities and the labour income tax.
Finally, hours are chosen to achieve an efficient bargain. This means that in equilibrium the marginal
product of labour must be equal to the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and the consumption
composite:
FN,it = −
Unh,t
Ux,t
. (A.39)
A.6 Equilibrium
In equilibrium all markets clear. The resource constraint completes the model:
Yt = Ct + It +Gt + g(zt)nt. (A.40)
The system of equations describing the full equilibrium is summarised in Appendix B.
A.7 Introducing sticky prices
The introduction of sticky prices changes the problem of final good firms i ∈ (0, 1) presented in Section
A.4 in that they now choose the price level, Pit, instead of the relative price, pit, and they face quadratic
price adjustment costs ξ2
(
Pit
Pit−1
− 1
)2
, where parameter ξ measures the degree of price stickiness. Thus,
the profit function now reads as follows:
Jt(nit) = Et


∞∑
s=0
Dt,t+s

 Pit+sPt+s (Cit+s +Git+s + Iit+s)−HCit+s
−wit+snit+shkt+s −RKt+sKit+s −
ξ
2
(
Pit+s
Pit+s−1
− 1
)2



 , (A.41)
The first-order conditions with respect toKit+s, nit+s, vkt+s,Cit+s, Scit+s, Git+s, S
g
it+s remain unaltered
relative to the flexible-price case, while taking the first-order condition with respect to the price level Pit+s
leads to the following:
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

Pit
Pt
(Cit +Git)− ξ
(
Pit
Pit+s
− 1
)
Pit
Pit−1
+ (1− η)
(
Pit
Pt
)1−η
It
+ηMCt
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
It − ηνct
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
Xct − ην
g
t
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
Xgt
+ξΛt,t+1
[(
Pit+1
Pit
− 1
)
Pit+1
Pit
]


= 0. (A.42)
Similar algebraic manipulations to those described in Section 2.4 lead to the following optimal pricing
decision in the symmetric equilibrium:3


(Xct +X
g
t + It)
[
1− ηη−1MCt
]
+ ηη−1(1− $
c) [λctX
c
t + λ
g
tX
g
t ]−
θc
η−1
(
Sct−1 + S
g
t−1
)
+ξEtΛt,t+1 [Πt+1 (Πt+1 − 1)]− ξΠt (Πt − 1)

 = 0, (A.43)
where Πt ≡
Pt
Pt−1
is the gross inflation rate. Note that the pricing equation (A.43) collapses to the analogous
flexible-price equation (A.32) when ξ = 0. Furthermore, when ξ > 0, real cost ξ2
(
Pt
Pt−1
− 1
)2
enters the
economy’s resource constraint.
A.8 Functional forms
Equation (A.2) specialises as a non-additively-separable utility function:
U(Xct , nt, 1− ht) = nt
[
Xc(1−$)t (1− ht)
$
]1−σc
− 1
1− σc
+ (1− nt)
Xc(1−$)(1−σc)t − 1
1− σc
,
where σc > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and $ is the elasticity of substitution between leisure
and consumption. When σc → 1, preferences are represented by an additively separable utility function;
while in the case of full employment, i.e. nt → 1, the equation reads as a standard utility function in
consumption and leisure compatible with balanced growth.
Investment adjustment costs take the form of a quadratic function:
S
(
It
It−1
)
=
γ
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
, µ > 0,
while we allow for a convex hiring cost function, i.e. g(zt) specialises as follows :
g(zt) =
χ
1 + ψ
z1+ψt , ψ > 0.
B Symmetric equilibrium
Production function and marginal products:
F ((ZK)tKt, (ZN)tntht) =
[
αK ((ZK)tKt)
σ−1
σ + αN ((ZN)tntht)
σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
(B.1)
3Equation (A.43) is obtained by combining equations (A.28), (A.30) and (A.42), substituting for the demands for Cit and
Git, (A.8) and (A.17), and rearranging.
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FK,t = αK(ZK)
σ−1
σ
t
(
Yt
Kt
) 1
σ
(B.2)
FN,t = αN (ZN)
σ−1
σ
t
(
Yt
ntht
) 1
σ
(B.3)
Utility function, marginal utilities and deep habits in consumption:
U(Xct , nt, 1− ht) = nt
[
(Xct )
(1−!)(1− ht)!
]1−σc − 1
1− σc
+ (1− nt)
(Xct )
(1−!)(1−σc) − 1
1− σc
(B.4)
Ux,t = (1− #) (X
c
t )
(1−!)(1−σ)−1
[
1 + nt
(
(1− ht)
!(1−σ) − 1
)]
(B.5)
Un,t =
(Xct )
(1−!)(1−σ) [(1− ht)!(1−σ) − 1]
1− σ
(B.6)
Uhn,t = −# (X
c
t )
(1−!)(1−σ) (1− ht)
!(1−σ)−1 (B.7)
Sct = #
cSct−1 + (1− #
c)Ct (B.8)
Ct = X
c
t + θ
cSct−1 (B.9)
Intertemporal investment/consumption decisions:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It
[
1− S
(
It
It−1
)]
(B.10)
S
(
It
It−1
)
=
γ
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
(B.11)
Qt = Et
{
Dt,t+1
[(
1− τkt+1
)
RKt+1 + (1− δ)Qt+1
]}
(B.12)
1 = Qt
[
1− S
(
It
It−1
)
− S′
(
It
It−1
)
It
It−1
]
+ Et
{
Dt,t+1Qt+1S
′
(
It+1
It
)(
It+1
It
)2}
(B.13)
Dt,t+1 = β
Ux,t+1
Ux,t
1 + τCt
1 + τ ct+1
(B.14)
1 = Et
[
Djt,t+1Rt+1
]
(B.15)
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MCtFK,t = R
K
t (B.16)
Hiring decisions and wage bargaining:
gt =
χ
1 + ψ
z1+ψt (B.17)
gz,t = χz
ψ
t (B.18)
nit+1 = (1− λ)nit + q(θt)vit (B.19)
g′(zt)
q(θt)
= Et
{
Dt,t+1
[
(MCtFN,t+1 − wt+1)ht+1 + g′ (zt+1) zt+1
−g(zt+1) + (1− λ)
g′(zt+1)
q(θt+1)
]}
(B.20)
wtht = (1− %)
[
MCtFN,tht − g(zt) + g
′(zt)zt + θtg
′(zt)
]
+ %

wu − Un,tUx,t
1− τwt

 (B.21)
FN,t = −
Unh,t
UC,t
(B.22)
zt =
vt
nt
(B.23)
θt =
vt
ut
(B.24)
ut = 1− nt (B.25)
qt = kθ
−ω
t (B.26)
pt = θtqt (B.27)
Further firms’ decisions:
1−MCt + (1− '
c)λct = ν
c
t (B.28)
EtDt,t+1(θ
cνct+1 + '
cλct+1) = λ
c
t (B.29)
x
1−MCt + (1− !
c)λgt = ν
g
t (B.30)
EtDt,t+1(θ
cνgt+1 + !
cλgt+1) = λ
g
t (B.31)


(Xct +X
g
t + It)
[
1− ηη−1MCt
]
+ ηη−1 (1− !
c) [λctX
c
t + λ
g
tX
g
t ]−
θc
η−1
(
Sct−1 + S
g
t−1
)
+ξEtΛt,t+1 [Πt+1 (Πt+1 − 1)−Πt (Πt − 1)]

 = 0 (B.32)
Government budget constraint and fiscal rules:
Bt = RtBt−1 +Gt + (1− nt)wu − τt − τ
C
t Ct − τ
W
t wtntht − τ
K
t R
k
tKt (B.33)
Sgt = !
cSgt−1 + (1− !
c)Gt (B.34)
Gt = X
g
t + θ
cSgt−1 (B.35)
log
(
Gt
G¯
)
= ρG log
(
Gt−1
G¯
)
+ (gt (B.36)
log
(
Xt
X¯
)
= ρX log
(
Xt−1
X¯
)
+ ρXB
Bt−1
yt−1
+ (Xt , Xt = (τ, τ
c, τw, τk) (B.37)
Resource constraint:
Yt = Ct + It +Gt + gtnt +
ξ
2
(
Pt
Pt−1
− 1
)2
(B.38)
Taylor rule and Fisher equation (sticky-price model):
log
(
Rnt
R¯n
)
= !pi log
(
Πt
Π¯
)
+ !y log
(
Yt
Y¯
)
(B.39)
Rt+1 = Et
[
Rnt
Πt,t+1
]
(B.40)
C Steady state
Steady-state values of the employment rate, n, hours worked, h, and the marginal cost, MC, solve simul-
tanously the wage equation, (B.21), the economy’s resource constraint, (B.38), and the pricing equation,
xi
(B.32), while the value of the remaining unknowns in the system of equations reported in Appendix A can
be found recursively by using the following relationships:
ZN = (ZN)0 (C.1)
ZK = (ZK)0 (C.2)
Y = Y0 (C.3)
D = β (C.4)
Q = 1 (C.5)
Π = 1 (C.6)
RK =
R+ δ
1− τK
(C.7)
(
K
Y
)
=MC
SK
RK
(C.8)
K =
(
K
Y
)
Y (C.9)
I = δK (C.10)
G =
(
G
Y
)
Y (C.11)
Sg = G (C.12)
Xg = (1− θc)G (C.13)
u = 1− n (C.14)
p =
λn
1− n
(C.15)
θ¯ =
(
p
κ
) 1
1−ω
(C.16)
q = κθ
−ω
(C.17)
v = uθ (C.18)
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z =
v
n
(C.19)
g =
χ
1 + ψ
z1+ψ (C.20)
gz = χz
ψ (C.21)
FN = αNMC (ZN)
σ−1
σ
(
Y
nh
) 1
σ
(C.22)
Fn = FNh (C.23)
X
c
=
1− $
$
FN
1 + n
((
1− h
)" (1−σc) − 1)(
1− h
)" (1−σc)−1 (C.24)
C =
Xc
1− θc
(C.25)
Sc = C (C.26)
Un =
(
X
c)(1−") (1−σc) ((1− h)" (1−σc) − 1)
1− σc
(C.27)
Ux = (1− $)
(
X
c)(1−") (1−σc)−1 (1 + n ((1− h)" (1−σc) − 1)) (C.28)
w =
1
Dh
[
−
gz
q
+D
(
Fn − g + zgz + (1− λ)
gz
q
)]
(C.29)
D Sensitivity exercises
D.1 Bargaining power
In Figure D.1 we show how the combination of different elasticities of substitutions (σ) and different
levels of firms’ bargaining power (() affect the response of output, unemployment and the real wage to
a government spending shock. In the left column, the technology is almost Leontief (σ = 0.10), in the
right column it approximates a Cobb-Douglas (σ → 1), while the central column features an intermediate
elasticity of substitution in the range of empirical estimates (σ = 0.40). Impulse responses are drawn with
( = {0.10, 0.50, 0.90}.
If σ = 0.10, despite the use of deep habits in consumption, by which the mark-up responds negatively
to a government spending shock, the real wage declines as the strong complementarity between capital and
labour induces firms to post relatively less vacancies and to a lower reservation wage for them. In other
words labour demand (through vacancy posting) “shifts” less than labour supply. This scenario predicts
an output multiplier less than unity and a small or even positive response of unemployment (if firms get
90% of total surplus in the wage bargaining).
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Figure D.1: Sensitivity of output and unemployment multipliers to changes in the firms’ bargaining power.
Note: Fiscal policy: government spending expansion (1% of output, lump-sum taxes, balanced budget). Model: RBC with
Mortensen-Pissarides Matching Friction (MPMF) and deep habits in consumption (θc = 0.86 and "c = 0.85). Responses of
output and the real wage are in percentage deviations from steady state. For the unemployment rate, absolute changes in
percentage points are reported. # = firms’ bargaining power; σ = elasticity of substitution between labour and capital.
If the technology is sufficiently away from Leontief, the greater firms’ share in the wage bargaining,
the smaller the increase in the real wage and the reduction in unemployment, given the smaller incentive
for households to sign labour contracts, keeping how they value non-work activities relative to work
activities (replacement ratio) constant. While output is not greatly affected by the calibration of the
factor elasticity of substitution and the bargaining parameter, the unemployment response is considerably
affected by both choices. In addition, as the technology tends to Leontief, the calibration of the bargaining
parameter becomes increasingly less important for the equilibrium outcome.
D.2 Hagedorn and Manovskii effect
A common result in the MPMF literature is that unemployment volatility importantly depends on the
calibration of the replacement ratio, Θ¯, i.e. the value of non-work to work activities. The higher is the
steady-state value of non-work to work activities, the higher is the volatility of unemployment. In the
literature Θ¯ ranges between Shimer (2005)’s 0.40 and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008)’s 0.95. In Figure
D.2 we show the sensitivity of the output and unemployment multipliers to the replacement ratio in the
model with deep habits in consumption and the CES production function. Increasing Θ¯ increases the
magnitudes of both multipliers, however the output multiplier changes only marginally. Even using the
CES production function (with σ = 0.4) – and hence incorporating a mechanism that moderates the
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Figure D.2: Sensitivity of output and unemployment multipliers to changes in the magnitude of the
replacement ratio.
Note: Fiscal policy: government spending expansion (1% of output, lump-sum taxes, balanced budget). Model: RBC
with Mortensen-Pissarides Matching Friction (MPMF), deep habits in consumption (θc = 0.86 and "c = 0.85), and CES
production function (σ = 0.40). Responses of output are in percentage deviations from steady state. For the unemployment
rate, absolute changes in percentage points are reported. Θ =replacement ratio.
unemployment multiplier per se, as explained above – if the replacement ratio is calibrated in the high
range of plausible values, i.e. between 0.90 and 0.95, the flexible-price model augmented with MPMF
and deep habits in consumption is able to reproduce the unemployment multiplier estimated by Monacelli
et al. (2010).
D.3 Quantitative implications of the choice of the replacement ratio and the bar-
gaining power
In Table D.1 we report the impact output multipliers and the unemployment peak multipliers obtained
with different parameterisations: (i) our baseline value of the replacement ratio (Θ = 0.7), which is close
to the estimate of 0.72 of Sala et al. (2008) versus the value used in the baseline calibration of Monacelli
et al. (2010) (Θ = 0.9), which is in the high range of empirical estimates; (ii) our baseline value for the
firms’ bargaining power (! = 0.5) versus two extreme cases in which either the workers or the firms get
almost the whole surplus (! = 0.1 or ! = 0.9, respectively); (iii) the CD production function (σ → 1)
versus a CES with σ = 0.4 (our baseline value).
As noted above, while the unemployment multiplier is very sensitive to the choice of the replacement
ratio, the output multiplier barely changes. Keeping σ constant, as firms gain a bigger share of the surplus
from employment, while the output multiplier slightly increases, the unemployment multiplier significantly
drops.
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(A) (B)
σ → 1 σ = 0.4 (B)/(A)
Θ = 0.7 " = 0.1 ∆Y∆G 1.69 1.40 0.83
∆u
∆G -0.31 -0.21 0.68
" = 0.5 ∆Y∆G 1.71 1.42 0.83
∆u
∆G -0.27 -0.18 0.67
" = 0.9 ∆Y∆G 1.79 1.46 0.82
∆u
∆G -0.14 -0.08 0.57
Θ = 0.9 " = 0.1 ∆Y∆G 1.68 1.39 0.83
∆u
∆G -0.82 -0.53 0.65
" = 0.5 ∆Y∆G 1.71 1.41 0.82
∆u
∆G -0.70 -0.44 0.63
" = 0.9 ∆Y∆G 1.78 1.45 0.81
∆u
∆G -0.30 -0.19 0.63
Table D.1: The impact of the fiscal stimulus in different scenarios
Note: Government spending expansion (1% of output, lump-sum taxes, balanced budget) in a model augmented with
Mortenses-Pissarides Matching Frictions and deep habit formation. Impact output multipliers and peak unemployment
multipliers are reported).
In relative terms (last column), almost irrespective of how the surplus is split between workers (") and
firms and how workers value non-work activities with respect to work activities (Θ), when σ drops from
1 (CD case) to 0.4, while the output multiplier is around 4/5 of the value obtained in the CD case; the
unemployment multiplier is around or even below 2/3 of the value delivered by the CD case. In sum, the
increasingly jobless stimulus obtainable as σ drops is robust to the calibration of the replacement ratio
and the bargaining power parameter.
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